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Abstract
We prove that the deficit on each trade in a Vickrey double auction for a
homogeneous good with multi-unit traders with multi-dimensional types is at least
as large as the Walrasian price gap. We also show that as the number of traders
grows large the aggregate deficit is bounded below by the ratio of the Walrasian
price and the elasticity of excess supply at the Walrasian price.
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1 Introduction
For the classic, private-value model of a market for a homogeneous good with buyers
and sellers who are privately informed about their demand and supply schedules, Vick-
rey (1961) showed that a two-sided version of the multi-unit auction that has become to
bear his name, which we here refer to as a Vickrey double auction, always runs a deficit
in the aggregate when the quantity traded is positive. Subsequent work has shown that
the deficit result continues to hold for any ex post efficient, dominant strategy mech-
anism that satisfies the agents’ individual rationality constraints, provided the agents’
type spaces are smoothly connected, and has extended the result to (expected) deficit
under any Bayesian incentive compatible and interim individually rational mechanism
when agents’ types are independently drawn from continuous distributions with identi-
cal, compact supports.1 Discussing his proposed mechanism, or scheme, Vickrey (1961,
p. 13, emphasis added) further noted:
The basic drawback to this scheme is, of course, that the marketing agency
will be required to make payments to suppliers in an amount that exceeds,
in the aggregate, the receipts from purchasers....
In this paper we strengthen Vickrey’s conclusion by proving two additional results.
First, we show that the Vickrey (or VCG)2 double auction incurs a deficit on every
unit that is traded and that this deficit per trade is at least as large as the Walrasian
price gap. This result is important because it improves economists’ understanding of
the working of the Vickrey double auction (and its relation to Walrasian prices).3 It
also provides a proof that the Vickrey double auction incurs a deficit in the aggregate.
Such proofs have been elusive. Vickrey’s argument rested on a graphical illustration
and much of the subsequent literature has established (im)possibility results relating
the sum of the agents’ marginal products,
ř
iPN pW ´W´iq to social welfare W , where
W´i is social welfare without i, concluding that a deficit is inevitable if for all type
realizations
ř
iPN pW´W´iq ě W is the case; see, for example, McAfee (1991), Makowski
1See, Holmström (1979), Williams (1999), and Krishna and Maenner (2001).
2So named after the contributions by Vickrey (1961), Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973).
3It is an interesting history-of-thought question to ask why our first result was not uncovered earlier.
Our speculative guess is that this is due to the literature on mechanism design and auctions having
bifurcated into an abstract and a more applied branch, with little interaction between the two. This
explanation is supported by the fact that of the over 8,800 papers that cite Vickrey (1961) and the
250 that refer to Rochet (1985) on Google scholar, only 20 cite both. None of these connect the deficit
uncovered by Vickrey to the unit price vectors that rely on the taxation principle of Rochet and form
the basis for our result.
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and Mezzetti (1994), Williams (1999), Yenmez (2015), Loertscher, Marx and Wilkening
(2015), or Segal and Whinston (2016). Although the generality of this approach has its
obvious merits, it also makes it hard to see under which conditions on the primitives
of the model (such as homogeneous goods with multi-unit demands and supplies) the
conditions are satisfied. Recently, Delacrétaz et al. (2019) showed that homogeneous
goods models are “assignment-representable”, which implies
ř
iPN pW ´W´iq ě W and
thereby proves impossibility as a function of the primitives of the model. However,
compared to our first result (stated as Theorem 1), the chain of reasoning this involves
is certainly longer, and there is no connection to the Walrasian price gap.
To establish our second result, we assume that as the number of traders goes to
infinity the probability measure generating values and costs guarantees the existence of
a well behaved aggregate excess supply, with an interior Walrasian price and quantity.4
Our second result, which generalizes Corollary 3 in Tatur (2005), is that as the number of
traders grows large the aggregate deficit is bounded below by the ratio of the Walrasian
price and the elasticity of the excess supply at the Walrasian price. Thus, while the
deficit on each trade goes to zero, the aggregate deficit remains bounded away from zero.
Section 2 introduces the setup, which is essentially the same as the one we study in
Loertscher and Mezzetti (2019), where we propose a dominant strategy, ex post individu-
ally rational, double clock auction that is deficit free and, under additional assumptions,
asymptotically efficient. Section 3 states and proves our first result that each trade gen-
erates a deficit. Section 4 derives the lower bound on the aggregate deficit with a large
number of traders. Section 5 concludes the paper by connecting our deficit result for
private goods to the deficit generated in the problem of providing a public good.
2 The setup
There are N buyers, indexed by b P N “ t1, ..., Nu, and N sellers, indexed by s PM “
t1, ..., Nu, of a homogeneous good. Let K “ Nsk be an upper bound on the number of
possible trades – i.e., on aggregate demand and supply – with k being an upper bound







4While the definition of a Vickrey double auction and the conclusion that it generates a deficit do
not require the use of any assumption about the prior distribution of the agents’ values and costs, any
result about the asymptotic distribution of the aggregate deficit requires a probabilistic structure.
5Assuming equal numbers of buyers and sellers and an equal upper bound k simplifies the exposition,
but does not affect the key results that the deficit per trade is at least as large as the Walrasian price
gap and that the aggregate deficit does not vanish when the economy grows. This is immediate for the
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function, or type, of buyer b, with vbk ě v
b
k`1 for all k P
 








the cost function, or type, of seller s, with csk ď c
s
k`1 for all k P
 














“ pcs, c´sq the profile
of costs and θ “ pθi,θ´iq “ pv, cq the profile of buyers’ and sellers’ types. Marginal
values and marginal costs are private information of each trader. We take the type
spaces to be bounded and assume that for all b P N , all s P M and all k P t1, . . . , ku
vbk, c
s
k P r0, 1s.
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By the taxation and revelation principles (see Rochet, 1985, and Myerson, 1979), any
dominant strategy mechanism is strategically equivalent to a price mechanism xq,py “
xtqpθq, pik pθ
´iquiPNYM,k“0,...,sky that sets an individualized marginal price schedule for
each agent as a function of the other agents’ types, lets each agent decide how many
units to trade, and has the property that each agent will find it optimal to trade the
quantity specified by qpθq.7
The allocation profile qpθq specifies the quantities qbpθq ě 0 and qspθq ě 0 traded
by each buyer b P N and seller s P M. Let qBpθq “
ř
bPN q
bpθq be the total quantity
acquired by buyers and qSpθq “
ř
sPM q
spθq be the total quantity given up by sellers.8







, where pik pθ
´iq is the
price agent i must pay (if a buyer) or must be paid (if a seller) for the k-th unit of the
good.






















A mechanism is feasible if for every θ, qBpθq “ qSpθq.






























first result, which only relies on the ordered list of marginal values and costs. The second, asymptotic
result only requires that in the limit the ratio of maximum demand over maximum supply is strictly
positive and finite. Without requiring it, this is the case if the numbers of buyers and sellers grow in
equal proportion.
6We discuss how the results extend to the case of unbounded types spaces after Theorem 2.
7The price pi0p¨q should be interpreted as a transfer made by trader i irrespectively of the quantity
traded.
8Letting Θ´i be the type space of all agents other than i, a dominant strategy mechanism must









and for all s PM and all θ´s P Θ´s, cs ď pcs implies qs pcs, θ´sq ě qs ppcs, θ´sq, where x ě px
means xi ě pxi for all i, and likewise for x ď px.
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A mechanism is ex post efficient if for all possible type profiles the buyers with the
highest marginal valuations trade with the sellers with the lowest marginal costs and the
total quantity traded is qBpθq “ qSpθq “ qW pθq, where qW pθq is a Walrasian (competitive
equilibrium) quantity associated with θ:9
max
 
q P t0, ..., Ku : vpqq ą crqs
(
ď qW pθq ď max
 
q P t0, ..., Ku : vpqq ě crqs
(
,
where we denote by xpkq the k-th greatest element and by xrks the k-th smallest element
of a given vector x. Thus, xpqq “ xrT`1´qs if the vector contains T elements. We also
adopt the notational convention that vp0q “ 1 and cr0s “ 0.
Because the type spaces are smoothly connected, dominant strategy and ex post
efficiency can be satisfied if and only if the mechanism is a Groves mechanism (e.g.,
see Holmström, 1979). Ex post individual rationality and deficit minimization further
restrict the mechanism to be a VCG mechanism, which in our case corresponds to a




















In a Vickrey double auction, a buyer acquiring no units pays pb0 “ 0 and a seller
not selling any units is paid ps0 “ 0.
10 To see that pb1 “ θ
´b
pKq is the negative externality
buyer b imposes on the other traders by acquiring her first unit, imagine the mechanism
designer collecting all K units from the sellers and then efficiently allocating them to
the traders (buyers and sellers), buyer b excluded, with the K highest marginal values
and costs. Since θ´b
pKq is the value or cost of the last assigned unit, it is the loss imposed
on others if buyer b obtains that unit instead. By the same reasoning, the externality b
imposes by acquiring the q-th unit is θ´b
pK`1´qq.
Similarly, imagine the designer giving the right to own K units to the buyers and
then efficiently procuring them from the traders, seller s excluded, with the K lowest
marginal values and costs. The positive externality of seller s on all other traders from
9Ex post efficiency implies feasibility.
10In other words, a VCG mechanism in our setting is a Groves mechanism with pb0 “ 0 “ p
s
0 for all b
and s.
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selling her first unit is ps1 “ θ
´s
rKs, the cost or value of the last unit procured when s is
excluded, which is saved if seller s sells that unit instead. The externality that s induces
when selling the q-th unit is θ´s
rK`1´qs.
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3 Deficit on every trade
While Vickrey (1961) showed that his double auction runs a deficit in the aggregate, The-
orem 1 below makes the stronger statement that it runs a deficit on each trade of at least
the size of the Walrasian price gap rp
W
pθq, pW pθqs, where pW pθq “ maxtvpqW pθq`1q, crqW pθqsu
and pW pθq “ mintvpqW pθqq, crqW pθq`1su. Theorem 1 thus also provides a simple way of
proving Vickrey’s result.
To understand the intuition behind Theorem 1, begin by defining the (decreasingly)
ordered list θO “ pθp1q, .., θpKq, θpK`1q, ..., θp2Kqq. From the point of view of buyers, the
Vickrey double auction allocates K units to the agents with the K highest types in θO.
If buyer b acquires a positive number of units under efficiency, it must be the case that
she prevents as many units from being obtained by other agents that would obtain these
units under efficiency if b were not there. Consequently, with b present, the values or
costs of these units belong to the bottom K elements of θO and constitute the social
opportunity cost b imposes.
Likewise, from the point of view of sellers the Vickrey double auction procures K
units from the agents with the K lowest types in the ordered list θO. If seller s procures
a positive number of units under efficiency, it must be the case that her presence crowds
out an equal number of units from being procured from other agents. Consequently,
the values or costs of the units that s crowds out belong to the top K elements in θO
and represent the social value s’s presence adds. Taken together, buyers pay unit prices
on units traded under efficiency that reflect elements from the bottom K entries in θO
while sellers are paid unit prices for units traded under efficiency that reflect elements
from the top K entries in θO.
By the argument made in the last two paragraphs, for any price p in the Walrasian
price gap there must be qW pθq marginal values and K ´ qW pθq marginal costs at least
as high as p; that is, pW “ θpKq “ θrK`1s, where the last equality follows from the
vector θ having 2K elements, and hence θpKq “ θr2K`1´Ks “ θrK`1s. There must also
11Note that each buyer’s unit price is increasing; the price on the pq ` 1q-th unit is at least as high
as the price on the q-th unit. Similarly, each seller’s unit price is decreasing; the price of the q-th unit
sold is at least as high as the price on the pq ` 1q-th unit.
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be K ´ qW pθq marginal values and qW pθq marginal costs at least as low as p; that is,
p
W
“ θrKs “ θpK`1q.
Figure 1 illustrates the connection between v, c and θ and the Walrasian price gap
for an example in which K “ 6, pW pθq “ vp5q and pW pθq “ cr5s.
12








































Figure 1: The relationship between v, c and θ and the Walrasian price gap
rp
W
pθq, pW pθqs. Values are plotted in red circles and costs in blue squares.
As an aside, observe that any choice of a single Walrasian trading price pW P
rp
W
pθq, pW pθqs would provide the right incentives to trade given the correct information
about demand and supply, but it would not provide traders with the right incentives to
reveal the correct information about supply and demand required to determine pW .
Theorem 1. In the Vickrey double auction, pW pθq “ θpKq “ θrK`1s is the lowest price
paid to any seller for a unit sold and p
W
pθq “ θpK`1q “ θrKs is the highest price paid
by any buyer for a unit bought. The Vickrey double auction does not generate positive
revenue, or a positive budget surplus, for any type profile and generates a strictly negative
budget surplus, or deficit, on every unit traded as long as qW pθq ą 0 and θpKq “ θrK`1s ą
θrKs “ θpK`1q.
Proof. Suppose efficiency requires s to sell quantity qs pθq at type profile θ. Since the




k, ...q is decreasing in k for k ě 1, the
lowest price paid to s on a unit sold is psqspθq pθ
´sq “ θ´s
rK`1´qspθqs. It must be c
s
qspθq ď
12The specific parameters are
v “ p0.9, 0.88, 0.86, 0.71, 0.58, 0.4q and c “ p0.1, 0.12, 0.25, 0.33, 0.5, 0.95q.
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psqspθq pθ
´sq, since s sells qs pθq units and hence has marginal cost below θ´s
rK`1´qspθqs for
at least qs pθq units. This implies that θ´s
rK`1´qspθqs ě θrK`1s “ θpKq, where the equality
holds because the vector θ contains 2K elements. This shows that psqspθq pθ
´sq ě θpKq.
Now suppose efficiency requires b to buy quantity qb pθq at type profile θ. Since the















, since b buys qb pθq units and
hence has marginal value above θ´b
pK`1´qbpθqq
for at least qb pθq units. This implies that
θ´b
pK`1´qbpθqq







Thus, we conclude that psqspθq pθ






; seller s is paid a
price on any unit sold at least as high as the price paid on any unit acquired by buyer
b.
Let DNpθq “ ´Rpθq denote the aggregate deficit in the Vickrey double auction with
N “ K{sk buyers and sellers. From Theorem 1 we know that:
DNpθq ě
”






qW pθq ě 0.
As the economy grows, the Walrasian price gap converges to zero under natural condi-
tions, but it is a priori unclear what happens to the aggregate deficit. If the Walrasian
price gap converged to zero fast, one should expect the aggregate deficit also to converge
to zero. In the next section we show that, under fairly general conditions, this is not the
case; that is, the aggregate deficit does not vanish as the number of traders grows.
4 The deficit lower bound in a large economy
To study the asymptotic properties of the deficit in the Vickrey double auction as the
number of buyers and sellers N Ñ 8, we need a model of the probability measure
generating traders’ valuations. As we will show, all that matters is convergence of the
aggregate excess supply in a neighborhood of the Walrasian equilibrium price and quan-
tity. Thus, we only need to make assumptions on aggregate excess supply, that is on the
aggregate profile of marginal values and marginal costs.
Given a distribution function H : r0, 1s Ñ r0, 1s, we denote by HrK`1:2Ks and HrK:2Ks
the K ` 1-st lowest and the K-th lowest order statistics out of 2K independent draws
of values of H, respectively.13 In addition, recalling that K “ skN , we now denote the
realized vector of types by θK .
13Up to now, the sample size was fixed, which is why we kept the dependence of the order statistics
on 2K implicit in our notation. As K now varies, it is useful to make this dependence explicit.
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Assumption 1. There exist unique q8W P p0, 1q, p
8
W P p0, 1q and a continuously dif-
ferentiable, strictly increasing distribution function H : r0, 1s Ñ r0, 1s with Hp0q “ 0,



















































1 for some L ą 0 and β ą 1.
Let pzKppq be the realized excess supply at price p when there are N buyers and N
sellers.14 Intuitively speaking, Assumption 1 requires that, as N and hence K grow large,
with probability one the quantity traded grows in proportion with the upper bound on
possible trades K and converges to Kq8W , the Walrasian price gap converges to a single
price p8W and that, in addition, in a neighborhood of the Walrasian price gap the realized
per-unit excess supply pzKppq
K
converges in probability to a function Z, which is convenient
to define by Zppq “ 2Hppq ´ 1.
More precisely, Condition 2 requires that the order statistics of the marginal values
and costs θrK`1:2Ks and θrK:2Ks converge in probability to the prices associated with the
K ` 1-st and K-th lowest out of 2K draws of H values. Since H is a distribution
function, draws of H values are uniformly distributed and thus HrK`1:2Ks and HrK:2Ks
converge with probability one to 1
2
. Thus, Condition 2 implies that the Walrasian price






. It also implies that locally,
around the limit Walrasian price, the Walrasian price gap behaves like the inverse of the
function H around 1
2
. In other words, in a neighborhood of the Walrasian quantity, per
unit excess supply behaves in the limit like the function Zppq “ 2Hppq ´ 1.
Condition 1 requires that the probability that the Walrasian quantity differs from
Kq8W becomes arbitrarily small as K grows large. If the values v
b and costs cs were
independently and identically distributed, it would hold by virtue of Chebyshev’s in-
equality with α “ 1 (Condition 2 would hold as well). The condition is a weak form of
the law of large numbers. It is well known that the law of large number holds in more
general settings than the case of iid draws. See for example the statistical literature on
weak dependence and mixing conditions (Bradley, 2005, and Dedecker et al., 2007); a


















typical assumption used to prove a general version of the law of large numbers for de-
pendent random variables is that covariances vanish as the difference in position of the
variables in an ordered list (e.g., the numbered list of traders) grows large. For examples
of the use of such conditions in economics see Cripps and Swinkels (2006), Loertscher
and Mezzetti (2019) and Peters and Severinov (2006).
Another non iid example in which Assumption 1 holds is the following. There is a
limit decreasing demand function KDppq and a limit increasing supply function KSppq,










be the inverse of S. Let m be an integer greater than
1. The marginal values of buyers are uniformly drawn without replacement from an





, with q “ 1
m
, ..., 1, m`1
m
, ..., K. The marginal values






, with q “ 1
m
, ..., 1, m`1
m
, ..., K.
Denote by hppq the derivative at p of the function H and by zppq “ 2hppq the
derivative of the limit per-unit excess supply function Z.
Theorem 2. Under Assumption 1, in the Vickrey double auction as the number of buyers
and the number of sellers N (and hence K “ kN) grow large the expected aggregate deficit
is bounded below by the ratio of the Walrasian price p8W and the elasticity of excess supply











Proof. The weak inequality displayed below follows from Theorem 1 and the equality

































For each K ě 1, define the random variables:















Hence, using the independence of the random variables YK and
qW pθKq
K
, we may write:
lim inf
NÑ8















































































Part (a) of Theorem 1 in Nagaraja, Bharath and Zhang (2015, p. 521) establishes that
the sequence of random variables YK converges in distribution to the random variable Y8
that has an exponential distribution with mean 1. All the YK and Y8 are non-negative,
hence by Fatou’s lemma:
1 “ E rY8s ď lim inf
K
E rYKs .
Since in addition 1´ε
ε2Kα








E rYK ¨ pq8W ´ εqs












Recalling that 2h pp8W q “ z pp
8








An implication of Theorem 2 is that the more inelastic demand and supply are at
p8W , the larger is the lower bound on the aggregate deficit.
Theorem 2 generalizes Corollary 3 in Tatur (2005) in two ways. His analysis assumed
that buyers and sellers have single-unit demand and single-unit supply with the buyers’
marginal values independently drawn from a distribution G and the sellers’ marginal
values independently drawn from a distribution F ,15 with F and G continuously differ-
entiable in a neighborhood of the Walrasian price P8W , and focused on Bayesian incentive
compatibility and interim individual rationality. In contrast, our focus is on dominant
strategies and ex post individual rationality. However, if one assumes independently
distributed types, then the difference between these notions is more in name than in
substance because of various equivalence results.16 Thus, with independently distributed
types our result generalizes Tatur’s to settings in which traders have multi-unit demands
and supplies and multi-dimensional types. In addition, we generalize the result beyond
independence, focusing on dominant strategies and ex post individual rationality with
multi-dimensional types.
We have assumed that the agents’ type spaces are bounded, as this is the common
assumption in the applied literature, but Theorem 1 and 2 easily extend to the case of
unbounded spaces. Specifically, assuming that marginal values and costs are in r0,8q,
the only substantive modifications we need to make are that the domain of the function
H is r0,8q instead of r0, 1s; limpÑ8Hppq “ 1, and the Walrasian price in the limit
economy, p8W , is finite.
One important case not covered by Assumption 1, and hence excluded from Theorem
2 as stated, is the case when values and costs are independent conditional on a state.
That is, suppose a random variable ω is first drawn from some set Ω and then condi-
15In such a case Assumption 1 holds with the limit Walrasian price p8W being the solution to F pp
8
W q “
1 ´ G pp8W q, the limit Walrasian quantity being q
8
W “ F pp
8
W q “ 1 ´ G pp
8
W q and the function H being
G`F
2 . We should note that when F “ G, a characterization of the Walrasian price gap can also be
obtained by applying Lemma 2 in Loertscher and Marx (2019).
A generalization where Assumption 1 also holds is if there are a finite number of subsets, with each
subset containing a proportion of buyers and sellers, with traders in each subset drawing their marginal
values and costs from the same distribution.
16Specifically, the payoff equivalence theorems of Williams (1999) and Krishna and Maenner (2001)
apply; the interim expected payoff of every trader is pinned down, up to a constant, by the allocation
rule. Both our analysis and Tatur’s consider the ex post efficient allocation with a payoff constant equal
to zero. In the case of the Vickrey double auction, the constant is zero because the ex post individual
rationality constraints are satisfied with equality for the worst-off types, that is, for buyers with vb1 “ 0
and for sellers with cs1 “ 1. It is to be noted, however, that Tatur (2005) does not assume that the
supports of F and G, i.e., the type spaces, are convex and hence Groves mechanisms need not be the
only efficient dominant strategy mechanisms.
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tional on ω marginal costs are independently drawn from a continuously differentiable
distribution Gω and marginal values from a continuously differentiable distribution Fω.
Nevertheless, and essentially at the only cost of introducing additional notation, Theorem
2 continues to hold under an appropriate generalization of Assumption 1. Specifically, the
generalization requires us to introduce state-dependent Walrasian quantities, denoted,
qW,ωpθKq; state-dependent limit equilibrium quantities and prices, denoted q
8
W,ω and
p8W,ω; state-dependent distributions denoted Hω (whose inverses and order-statistics we
denote by H´1ω and HrK:2Ks,ω, respectively); and state-dependent excess supply functions




W , H, Zppq “ 2Hppq´1
and zppq. Note that with conditional independence, Hωppq “ pGωppq ` Fωppqq{2. Using
these substitutions, we impose Assumption 1 for every state ω P Ω to obtain the follow-
ing corollary to Theorem 2, where DN,ωrθKs denotes the deficit in state ω at type profile
θK :
Corollary 1. Under conditional independence, with Assumption 1 holding for every










We have considered the Vickrey double auction in a homogeneous good market in which
buyers and sellers have multi-dimensional private information about their multi-unit
demands and supplies. Vickrey (1961) had shown that his double auction runs an ag-
gregate deficit. We have provided a twofold generalization of Vickrey’s result. First we
have proven that each trade runs a deficit at least as large as the Walrasian price gap.
Second, we have shown that when the number of traders grows large the aggregate deficit
is bounded from below by the ratio of the Walrasian price and the elasticity of excess
supply at the Walrasian price.
Beyond the case of a private good we have studied here, the analysis of incentive
problems in the context of public goods also has a long tradition in economics, begin-
ning with Samuelson (1954) and subsequent contributions by Clarke (1971) and Green
and Laffont (1977), among many others. This raises the question of whether a similar
connection between competitive equilibrium prices – in this case, the Lindahl prices –
and the deficit under incentive compatibility and individual rationality exists for this
problem. We now briefly argue that the answer is yes.
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Consider a binary public goods problem in the spirit of Green and Laffont (1977), in
which each agent i P N has a willingness to pay vi P r0, 1s for a pure public good whose
production cost is C P p0, Nq, where N is the cardinality of the set N . Efficiency dictates
that the good be produced if and only if
ř
iPN v
i ą C. The dominant strategy prices that
respect the agents’ individual rationality constraints ex post and maximize the planner’s
profit, subject to allocating efficiently, are such that all agents pay 0 if the good is not
produced. If it is produced, agent i pays pipvq “ maxt0, C´
ř
j‰i v
ju with v “ pviqiPN . If














with cardinality A is the set of agents who are pivotal. (If
A is empty, then Rpvq “ 0, implying a deficit of C ą 0.) If revenue is positive, then the
deficit DNpvq “ C ´Rpvq satisfies



















where piL “ v
i are the Lindahl prices for this problem (see Mas-Colell, Whinston and






i; the second follows
because production is efficient and it is a strict inequality unless A “ 1.17 This resonates
with the deficit bound in the Vickrey double auction, where pW pθq ´ pW pθq is the max-
imum profit per trade an auctioneer can make who is constrained to allocate efficiently
and choose buyer and seller prices that belong to the Walrasian price gap.
17Note, however, that if A “ 1, the deficit is still strictly positive unless by a fluke vj “ 0 for all j R A.
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